Thought experiment:
Scenario A: Suppose your neighbor is manufacturing anthrax
spores in his basement. There's no indication of evil
intent, it seems to be just a
hobby. He claims he's taking reasonable precautions.
But you're uncertain: an accident or a robbery
involving those spores could kill you or your loved ones.
Is it a proper function of government
to confiscate his spores?
Scenario B: Suppose your neighbor has a gun.
There's no indication of evil
intent, it seems to be just a
hobby. He claims he's taking reasonable precautions.
But you're uncertain: an accident or a robbery
involving that gun could kill you or your loved ones.
Is it a proper function of government
to confiscate his weapon?
My guess is: most people, even most libertarians,
would find government intervention
OK in Scenario A, not in Scenario B.
But what's the difference? Could it simply be the perceived/actual
level of risk involved?
Is there some principled
way to quantify
that, to justify government actions that mitigate extreme
Scenario-A levels of risk, while somehow stopping short of
a totalitarian nanny state that disallows any Scenario B-style activity
that might conceivably put innocent parties at risk, but probably
won't?
I don't know. And (as a dilettante in libertarian political
philosophy)
I've been thinking about this sort of thing for a number of years
without coming to a satisfactory conclusion.
It all seems to revolve around the concept
of risk, though.
One of my efforts at self-education was to pick up this book:
The Norm Chronicles by Michael Blastland and David
Spiegelhalter. Its subtitle: Stories and Numbers About Danger and
Death.
Seemingly very relevant to my lackadaisical intellectual quest!
Blastland and Spiegelhalter illustrate their story using
fictional typical characters: there's the risk-averse Prudence;
the thrill-and-pleasure-seeking, risk-be-damned Kevlin brothers
(Kelvin, Kevin, and Kieran); and then there is Norm, who is
completely (guess what) normal, all the way
down to his weight and height, and seeks moderation in all
things risky. (At one self-reflective point, he marvels at
how paradoxically unusual his normality makes him.)
The book is a romp through the major categories of Things That
Could Possibly Do You In:
getting born, of course, but also
giving birth; sex; crime; transportation;
drugs, licit and illicit; your lifestyle; medical woes; etc.
Wherever possible, the authors quantify: risky activities
are measured in "micromorts", a one-in-a-million chance of
death. (For example: serving in Afghanistan exposes one
to a risk of 22 micromorts per day; World War II RAF bomber
pilots experienced 25,000 micromorts per mission.)
Chronic risks are measured in
"microlives", about a half-hour
in length. (Examples: each cigarette smoked will set you back
about 0.5 microlives; being male instead of female
will cut off about 4 microlives per day.)
And there are the big risks: climate change,
earthquakes, and stuff falling from above (meteors,
killer asteroids, unfortunate stowaways in airplane
wheelwells …)
All these morbid facts and numbers
are presented with enough wit and charm to make them
(paradoxically) lively and interesting. Norm, Prudence,
and the Kevlins become actually sympathetic characters
in the narrative.
And it's funny. Try reading this without amusement:
[…] We know for sure that countless things—unlikely or not—will happen
somewhere to someone, as they must. More than that, we know that they
will often happen in strange and predictable patterns. Fatal falls from
ladders among the approximately 21 million men in England and Wales in
the five years to 2010 were uncannily consistent, numbering 42, 54, 56,
53, and 47. For all the chance particulars that apply to any individual
among 21 million individuals, the numbers are amazingly, fiendishly
stable—unlike the ladders. Some calculating God, painting fate by
numbers up in the clouds, orders another splash of red: "Hey, you in the
dungarees, we're short this month."
So: a fine book, wonderfully entertaining, and I learned a lot.
But did I get any illumination on the topic that drove me here, seeking
some sort of objective, principled guidance on the proper regulation
of risk in a free society?
No. If anything, the opposite. The authors just about convinced me
that there is no bright line that can be drawn between
risks that must be prohibited and risks for which laissez-faire
is the proper policy. Some cases seem clear, but those in between
will probably forever be a matter of unresolvable conflict
between people with different values and attitudes. We could
handwave about distinguishing
between "rational concerns" and "irrational fears", but
there's no infallible test, as near as I can tell, that will
allow one to tell one from the other in all possible cases.
But I'll keep looking.